

Message Text

SECRET

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 BELGRADE 5561

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
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SUBJ: TITO AND HARRIMAN MEETING

1. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR EAGLEBURGER, WAS RECEIVED JULY 28 BY PRESIDENT TITO AT HIS PRIVATE RETREAT ON THE ISLAND OF VANGA. FOLLOWING AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR AND THE PRESIDENT, ATTENDED BY AMBASSADOR EAGLEBURGER AND TITO'S CHEF D'CABINET BAUDERINA, PRESIDENT TITO HOSTED A LUNCHEON FOR THE GOVERNOR AND MRS. HARRIMAN, ATTENDED BY AMBASSADOR AND MRS. EAGLEBURGER, MR. BAUDERINA AND A FEW OTHER YUGOSLAV GUESTS.

2. DURING THE MEETING PRECEDING LUNCH THE DISCUSSION INCLUDED NONALIGNMENT, SOVIET-US RELATIONS, CHINA, AND US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE CONVERSATION ON EACH OF THESE SUBJECTS FOLLOWS:

3. NONALIGNMENT. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN COMPLIMENTED PRESIDENT TITO ON HIS SPEECH TO THE NAM CONFERENCE, SAYING IT SHOWED WHAT "REAL NONALIGNMENT IS," AND ASKED FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE NAM, AND CUBA'S ROLE THEREIN. PRESIDENT TITO SAID THAT THE NONALIGNED ARE NOW FACED WITH EFFORTS TO DILUTE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BELGRA 05561 01 OF 03 301615Z

THE CONCEPT OF NONALIGNMENT AS ESTABLISHED IN 1961. THE CUBANS WILL BE NOMINALLY AT THE HEAD OF THE MOVEMENT FOR THE THREE YEARS FOLLOWING THE HAVANA SUMMIT AND YUGOSLAVIA IS WORKING HARD NOW TO ASSURE THAT CASTRO WILL NOT "DOMINATE" THE NAM DURING THAT PERIOD. HE ASKED RHETROICALLY "WHERE WAS CUBA IN 1961 WHEN WE BEGAN THINGS?" AND ADDED THAT THE EFFORT BY "SOME" TO

TURN THE NAM INTO A "THIRD FACTOR BETWEEN THE BLOCS, BUT SUPPORTING ONE BLOC, COULD ONLY MAKE THE WORLD SITUATION WORSE." YUGOSLAVIA DID NOT INTEND TO LET THAT HAPPEN. TITO WENT ON TO SAY THAT CASTRO WILL NOT SUCCEED IN HIS ATTEMPTS TO SPLIT THE MOVEMENT INTO WHAT CUBA DESCRIBES AS "PROGRESSIVE" AND "REACTIONARY" FACTIONS, AND THAT YUGOSLAVIA HAD STRONG ALLIES IN ITS BATTLE AGAINST CASTRO'S ATTEMPTS TO TAKE OVER THE MOVEMENT. THESE ALLIES, HE SAID, INCLUDE ALGERIA, TANZANIA, INDIA, SRI LANKA, BANGLADESH, ZAMBIA, AND "MANY OTHERS." "WE ARE NOT AFRAID," HE SAID, "AND WE ARE READY TO DO BATTLE."

4. IN RESPONSE TO A HARRIMAN QUESTION ON SOVIET AND CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA, TITO SAID THAT "SOME INTERVENTION" IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS MAY BE A NECESSARY EVIL, GIVEN THE CURRENT STATE OF RELATIONS ON THE CONTINENT. BUT NO AFRICAN COUNTRY WILL LET ITS POLICIES BE CHANGED BY THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN ELEMENTS WITHIN THE COUNTRY. PRESIDENT TITO NOTED THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT IN THE SPEECHES GIVEN AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE NAM CONFERENCE THIS WEEK IN RESPONSE TO HIS ADDRESS, THE SPOKESMEN FROM EACH OF THE FOUR CONTINENTS WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO STRESS THE NEED FOR NAM UNITY AND TO PAY TRIBUTE TO YUGOSLAVIA FOR ITS LEADING ROLE WITHIN THE MOVEMENT.

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SECRET

PAGE 03 BELGRA 05561 01 OF 03 301615Z

5. US-SOVIET RELATIONS. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN NOTED THAT US-SOVIET RELATIONS HAD DETERIORATED IN THE PERIOD SINCE THE GOVERNOR HAD SEEN PRESIDENT TITO IN WASHINGTON LAST MARCH. THE GOVERNOR SAID HE WANTED TO REASSURE PRESIDENT TITO, HOWEVER, THAT PRESIDENT CARTER REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO BOTH SALT AND A CTB. HE ADDED THAT SECRETARY VANCE HAS DEVELOPED A VERY GOOD RELATIONSHIP OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO AND THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THIS PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WILL BE A GREAT ASSET IN THE MONTHS AHEAD. HE WENT ON TO EXPLAIN TO PRESIDENT TITO THE SEVERE IMPACT THAT THE SHCHARANSKIY TRIAL HAS HAD ON CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THAT AS A CONSEQUENCE THE PRESIDENT'S ROOM FOR MANEUVER WOULD CONTINUE SEVERELY RESTRICTED IN THE ABSENCE OF SOME CONCILIATORY MOVE ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS. THE GOVERNOR ASKED WHETHER PRESIDENT TITO SAW ANY WAY FOR THE US AND THE SOVIETS TO MOVE TO FREE THEMSELVES FROM THEIR PRESENT DIFFICULTIES.

5. PRESIDENT TITO REPLIED THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT

THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF AN EXCHANGE OF THE TWO
SOVIET SPIES ARRESTED IN NEW YORK FOR SHCHARANSKIY, AND
THAT IF THIS EXCHANGE WENT FORWARD IT MIGHT AT LEAST
SERVE TO REMOVE THE CASE AS A CAUSE CELEBRE. GOVERNOR
HARRIMAN SAID THAT HE ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT SUCH AN
EXCHANGE MIGHT BE A POSSIBILITY BUT DID NOT KNOW
WHETHER IT WOULD IN FACT TAKE PLACE.

6. PRESIDENT TITO SAID "I CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT THE
UNITED STATES IS READY TO PUT THE ISSUE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN ITS PROPER PERSPECTIVE AND EMPHASIZE ATTEMPTS
TO RESOLVE THE MAIN ISSUES THAT EXIST BETWEEN THE US
AND THE USSR. THAT IS THE IMPRESSION I GOT FROM
PRESIDENT CARTER WHEN I VISITED WASHINGTON, AND I
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 BELGRA 05561 01 OF 03 301615Z

HOPE IT IS STILL HIS INTENTION." GOVERNOR HARRIMAN
COMMENTED THAT THE SHCHARANSKIY CASE -- A DIRECT SOVIET
PROVOCATION AND PERSONAL INSULT TO THE PRESIDENT -- HAS
DEEPLY PROVOKED THE AMERICAN PUBLIC.

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PAGE 01 BELGRA 05561 02 OF 03 301458Z
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 BELGRADE 5561

EXDIS

DID PRESIDENT TITO HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS ON HOW WE MIGHT
PROCEED NOW, GIVEN THE IMPACT OF THE SHCHARANSKIY
CASE? TITO SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST UNDERSTAND
THAT SOVIET PRESTIGE IS INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN

THE SHCHARANSKIY AND GINZBURG CASES. THE SOVIETS ARE INTENT UPON SHOWING THE US AND THE DISSIDENTS THAT THE LATTER CANNOT BE "USED" IN DISCUSSIONS OF OTHER ISSUES. THE SOVIETS ARE DOING THIS FOR BOTH INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL REASONS. THEY HAVE DECIDED TO BE "MORE DETERMINED" IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE UNITED STATES; THEY INTEND TO SHOW THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT, WHEN PUSHED ON THE ISSUE OF DISSIDENTS, RETREAT. THEY MEAN TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE UNITED STATES THAT IT MUST STAY OUT OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOVIET UNION.

7. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN POINTED OUT THAT DESPITE THE DIFFERENCES OVER HUMAN RIGHTS THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO BE READY TO NEGOTIATE ON SALT AND HAVE FOR THE FIRST TIME PUT FORTH A CONSTRUCTIVE MBFR PROPOSAL. MOSCOW IS, IN OTHER WORDS, INDICATING ITS DESIRE TO MOVE AHEAD IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL, WHICH IS OF INTEREST TO BOTH COUNTRIES. THIS IS TRUE, SAID TITO, BUT MOSCOW CONSIDERS US INVOLVEMENT WITH THE DISSIDENTS AS INTERFERENCE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND WILL NOT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BELGRA 05561 02 OF 03 301458Z

ACCEPT IT. SHCHARANSKIY, GINZBURG, AND THE OTHER DISSIDENTS ARE, SO FAR AS MOSCOW IS CONCERNED, CITIZENS OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND ONLY THEY CAN DECIDE THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY WILL BE JUDGE UNDER THEIR LAWS. "PERSONALLY I FEEL THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT UNREALISTIC IN THEIR VIEW THAT NO ONE CAN PLAY IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS. FRANKLY, THE ADMINISTRATION'S MOST SERIOUS MISTAKE WAS TO HAVE PUT SUCH EXTREME EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE" (CSCE). EVERY LARGE COUNTRY, SAID TITO, WILL ALWAYS INSIST THAT IT HAS THE RIGHT TO DECIDE ITS OWN AFFAIRS. SO FAR AS US PUBLIC OPINION IS CONCERNED, MOSCOW BELIEVES THAT HAS ALWAYS BEEN ANTI-SOVIET AND THEREFORE CHANGES IN DEGREE ARE UNIMPORTANT. THE SOVIETS ARE NOT PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH ADMINISTRATION ARGUMENTS ABOUT ITS PUBLIC OPINION PROBLEMS.

8. GOVERNOR HARRIAMN SAID THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAS CONSISTENTLY AND RECENTLY MADE IT CLEAR THAT NEITHER HE NOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WANTS TO INTERVENE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOVIET UNION. BUT, WITH REGARD TO THE SHCHARANSKIY CASE, THERE IS NO WAY THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CAN CHANGE ITS PRESENT POSITION. THE SOVIETS NEED TO MAKE SOME GESTURE.

9. PRESIDENT TITO RETURNED AGAIN TO HIS REFERENCE TO THE BELGRADE CSCE, SAYING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S INITIAL APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS WAS "UNFORTUNATE."

WASHINGTON FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE BELGRADE CSCE WAS TO ADDRESS ISSUES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY; THOSE SECURITY ISSUES SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE FOCUS, RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. TITO SAID THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE IMPORTANT,
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 BELGRA 05561 02 OF 03 301458Z

BUT THERE SHOULD BE SOME "BALANCE."

10. WHAT IS NEEDED NOW, TITO SAID, IS TO FIND SOME WAY TO "FREEZE THE CONTROVERSY" SO THAT THE US AND THE USSR CAN DEVOTE THEMSELVES TO BASIC ISSUES. PERHAPS THE ADMINISTRATION, WHILE CONTINUING TO MAINTAIN THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, COULD EMPHASIZE THE NEED TO RESOLVE BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES THAT AFFECT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACE.

11. CHINA. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN RECALLED THAT PRESIDENT TITO HAD ONCE TOLD HIM THAT THE CHINESE HAD CALLED HIM A "REVISIONIST BANDIT," BUT RELATIONS NOW HAVE GREATLY CHANGED. HE ASKED FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF CHINA. TITO SAID HE HAD SOME IMPRESSIONS FROM HIS RECENT VISIT TO PEKING, AND WOULD KNOW MORE FOLLOWING HUA KUO-FENG'S VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA IN AUGUST. HE INDICATED THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE NEW CHINESE LEADERSHIP IS ACTIVELY SEARCHING FOR WAYS TO OPEN ITSELF TO THE WORLD; THEY KNOW THEY CANNOT DEVELOP WITHOUT CONTACT WITH THE OUTSIDE; THEY ARE A POOR COUNTRY AND GREATLY IN NEED OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND VAST IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR AGRICULTURAL SITUATION. THEY ARE INTERESTED IN WESTERN TECHNOLOGY TO MAKE UP FOR THEIR BACKWARDNESS; ADDITIONALLY, THEY ARE INTENT UPON CREATING A MODERN ARMY SINCE THEY RECOGNIZE THAT NUMBERS ARE NO LONGER THE "ESSENTIAL FACTOR." "THE CHINESE WANT -- AND THEY ARE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT -- MAXIMUM SECURITY. AND THEY WANT TO KNOW THE WORLD BETTER."

12. TITO SAID THAT DURING HIS VISIT TO PEKING HE HAD REPROACHED THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP WITH REGARD TO THEIR POLICY IN AFRICA. HE SAID THAT THE PRC WAS SO INTENSELY ANTI-SOVIET THAT IT WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT WHATEVER AFRICAN REGIME FOUND ITSELF THREATENED BY THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 BELGRA 05561 02 OF 03 301458Z

USSR OR ALLIES OF THE USSR. THIS IS, SAID TITO,

"UNPRINCIPLED." BUT AT THE SAME TIME HE RECOGNIZED
THAT IT WAS INEVITABLE, SINCE PEKING VIEWS THE USSR
AS ITS "FIRST AND MAIN ENEMY."

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PAGE 01 BELGRA 05561 03 OF 03 301449Z
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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 BELGRADE 5561

EXDIS

13. PRESIDENT TITO SAID THAT HE WOULD HOLD EXTENSIVE
TALKS WITH HUA KUO-FENG WHEN THE LATTER IS IN BELGRADE.
THE CHINESE HAVE INDICATED THEY ARE INTERESTED IN
STUDYING YUGOSLAVIA'S AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM, ITS
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ITS SYSTEM OF SELF
MANAGEMENT. THE CHINESE MAY TRY TO INTRODUCE AT
LEAST SOME ASPECTS OF THE SELF MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN
AN ATTEMPT TO STIMULATE PRODUCTION.

14. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN NOTED THAT HE WAS SURE THAT ANY
THOUGHTS PRESIDENT TITO MIGHT HAVE ON CHINA FOLLOWING
THE AUGUST HUA KUO-FENG VISIT WOULD BE OF GREAT INTEREST
TO PRESIDENT CARTER. HE HOPED THE PRESIDENT WOULD PASS
ANYTHING OF INTEREST ON TO WASHINGTON. TITO REPLIES
THAT HE WOULD DO SO "GLADLY."

15. US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN SAID
THAT IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT OUR BILATERAL REALTIONS
WERE AT A NEW HIGH POINT. PRESIDNET TITO SAID THAT WAS
CORRECT; THEY ARE VERY GOOD AND IMPROVING EVERY DAY.
PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MARKOVIC HAD
REPORTED TO HIM ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE UNITED
STATES, AND HAD INDICATED HIS GREAT SATISFACTION WITH
IT. THERE ARE NO MAJOR PROBLEMS BETWEEN OUR TWO
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BELGRA 05561 03 OF 03 301449Z

COUNTRIES AND MANY SMALL MATTERS HAVE ALSO BEEN SETTLED. THERE ARE A FEW SMALL ISSUES (UNSPECIFIED) STILL BETWEEN US, BUT THEY ARE OF NO SIGNIFICANCE. TITO SAID THAT HE HAD A VERY GOOD IMPRESSION OF PRESIDENT CARTER WHEN HE MET WITH HIM. HE RECOGNIZES THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD INITIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CONGRESS BUT CONSIDERS HIM "A SINCERE, HONEST, DEVOTED LEADER WHO WANTS TO ACCOMPLISH MUCH."

16. THE PRESIDENT THEN SAID: "THE UNITED STATES MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IF WE SOMETIMES ARE CRITICAL IT IS ONLY BECAUSE WE MEAN THE US WELL. WE HAVE LEARNED TO LIVE TOGETHER AS FRIENDS DESPITE THE FACT THAT ONE OR THE OTHER MAY BE CRITICAL ON OCCASION. WITH SOME OTHER CONTRIES, HOWEVER, WHERE ON ITS FACE IT APPEARS THAT YUGOSLAVIA HAS VERY GOOD RELATIONS, IT IS A FACT THAT IN REALITY THE RELATIONS ARE NOT GOOD. AND YOU KNOW WHO I MEAN." (THIS IS OBVIOUSLY A REFERENCE TO THE SOVIET UNION).

17. TITO RECALLED THAT IN HIS FIRST MEETING WITH GOVERNOR HARRIMAN WHEN THE LATTER WAS AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW DURING THE WAR, THE GOVERNOR HAD TOLD HIM OF STALIN'S HIGHLY CRITICAL ANTI-TITO REMARKS. TITO SAID IT IS AN INTERESTING FACT THAT WHENEVER STALIN DEALT WITH HIM, HE WAS KIND, HE MADE A GREAT FUSS, ETC. BUT HE (TITO) KNEW THE TRUE REALITY. GOVERNOR HARRIAMN REPLIED THAT STALIN WAS A VERY INSINCERE MAN. "YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, WERE THE FIRST TO EXPOSE HIM AND THAT DESTROYED HIS AMBITIONS FOR DEOMINATION OF THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT." TITO REPLIED "ABSOLUTELY. HAD WE NOT SAID 'NO' TO HIM WHEN WE DID, OTHER DIFFICULTIES WOULD HAVE ARISEN FOR US AND THE REST OF THE WORLD, AND GOD KNOWS WHERE
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SECRET

PAGE 03 BELGRA 05561 03 OF 03 301449Z

WE WOULD NOW BE."

18. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN THEN ASKED PRESIDENT TITO ABOUT HIS RELATIONS WITH CHAIRMAN BREZHNEV. TITO REPLIED THAT THEY WERE VERY GOOD, "BUT I THINK MANY THINGS ARE BEING DONE TO US DESPITE HIM."

19. IN REPLY TO AN OBSERVATION BY GOVERNOR HARRIMAN THAT IT WAS HIS FEELING THAT BREZHNEV APPEARED TO BE IN THE MIDDLE OF OPPOSING FORCES WITHIN THE POLITBURO AND

NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO CONTAIN THEM, TITO REPLIED THAT THAT WAS HIS BELIEF AS WELL. TITO SAID THAT HE BELIEVES BREZHNEV TO BE WELL INTENTIONED BUT CLEARLY WEAKENED BY ILL HEALTH. SUSLOV IS THE FORCE THAT IS DIFFICULT FOR BREZHNEV TO CONTROL.

20. COMMENT: IT WAS GOVERNOR HARRIMAN'S IMPRESSION THAT, IN COMPARISON WITH THE LAST MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO IN WASHINGTON IN MARCH, PRESIDENT TITO HAD DETERIORATED SUBSTANTIALLY IN ALERTNESS AND VITALITY. (THIS IS A VIEW THAT AMBASSADOR EAGLEBURGER SHARES FROM HIS OWN OBSERVATION OF PRESIDENT TITO DURING THE MARCH VISIT TO WASHINGTON.) THIS WAS MOST EVIDENT IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE DISCUSSION, BUT THE PRESIDENT BECAME MORE ANIMATED AS THE CONVERSATION PROCEEDED. IN FACT, AT ONE POINT WHEN BAUDERINA ATTEMPTED TO BREAK OFF THE DISCUSSION SO THAT THE PARTICIPANTS COULD GO TO LUNCH, TITO REMARKED, "NOT YET, I STILL HAVE MORE I WANT TO TALK ABOUT."

21. AS THE LUNCH BEGAN TITO WAS, AGAIN, QUIET AND DETACHED. BUT AS THE CONVERSATION TURNED TO REMINISCENCES HE SHOWED AN INCREASINGLY LIVELY INTEREST AND A KEEN SENSE OF HUMOR.
EAGLEBURGER

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